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Abstract
The paper analyzes how organized crime affects the economy through
its impact on the effective demand, following the Neo-Kaleckian approach.
From this perspective, the presence of organized crime, on the one hand,
tends to reduce the effective demand draining resources through extor-
tion, bribery of public officials and encouraging consumption of criminal
goods (illegal goods and goods produced in the underground economy), on
the other hand, tends to increase the effective demand using the proceeds
of criminal activity in the purchase of legal consumption and investment
goods. The model highlights the opposing action of these two forces and
identifies the conditions for a negative impact on the degree of capacity
utilization and the growth rate. For the latter, these conditions tend to be
more stringent, due to the direct impact of organized crime on investment
decisions. Overall, the operation of organized crime tends to negatively
influence the economic activity to the extent that the income drained from
the legal sector is not reused into the same sector.
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1 Introduction.
The paper analyzes the macroeconomic impact of organized crime (OC)
like the Camorra, Cosa Nostra1 , and ’Ndrangheta in Southern Italy, the Yakuza
in Japan, and the Triade in China, on the economic system.
Our interest arises from the consideration that the presence of OC has a
significant impact on the economic system. In fact, a recent report2 by the
Italian business trade group, Confesercenti, said that the Italian OC has reached
such epidemic proportions in Italy that the four largest traditional (Italian-
based) OC groups, the Camorra, Cosa Nostra, ’Ndrangheta and Sacra Corona
Unita, now have larger cash reserves than any of the country’s banks. OC
groups currently rake in more than €120 billion each year. That is more than
7% of Italy’s GDP. It is believed that OC groups have cash reserves of about
€65 billion on hand, more than any legitimate Italian lender and they represent
Italy’s No.1 bank. Moreover, as a result of the financial crisis, the four largest
OC groups have broken out of their traditional strongholds in the south and
other local regions and are involved in almost every aspect of Italy’s economy.
To avoid misunderstandings, it is best to start our analysis by clarifying
that in this paper we will use the term organized crime (OC) to define a set of
criminal organizations characterized by the following elements:
(i) they act in a defined geographical area where there is State vacuums;
(ii) they are involved in multiple legal and illegal activities;
(iii) they develop forms of coordination, characterized by long-run horizon and
different types of hierarchical structures;
(iv) they use the violence or the threat of violence in order to achieve a local
control and promote their business.3
The first characteristic is the local dimension of OC. In fact, OC replaces
the State in the protection of property rights in regions where the institutions
are weak or absent. This happens in contexts where the State is geographic,
1Cosa Nostra is the Sicilian Mafia, notorious also in some provinces as "Stidda". We prefer
this term since American and Sicilian Mafiosi refer to their organization by the term "cosa
nostra" (Our Thing). The term Mafia can be applied to any criminal organization, as for
example to the Russian Mafia or the Nigerian Mafia.
2Rapporto SOS Imprese (2011).
3For a broad and complete analysis of the evolution of the definition of "organized crime",
from the “Alien Conspiracy” to the “Illegal Enterprise” paradigm, see Paoli (2002), in which
OC is defined as "the planned violation of the law for profit or to acquire power, whose
offences are each, or together, of a major significance and are carried out by more than two
participants who cooperate within a division of labor for a long or undetermined time-span
using commercial or commercial-like structures, violence or other means of intimidation or
influence on politics, media, public administration, justice, and legitimate".
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ethnic or social distant, where revolutions, wars or political changes create a
power vacuum, or where the legal regulation of production and distribution of
goods leaves room to illegal economic activities.4
The second characteristic is the multisectorial dimension of OC which is
involved in illegal (production and distribution of illegal drugs, human traffic,
counterfeiting of goods, etc.) and legal sectors where criminal revenues are
laundered. OC typically penetrates in legal economy operating in traditional
sectors, characterized by a small or medium size of firms, low levels of technology
and human capital, a limited interregional (or international) competition, and
a large presence of public sector.5
The third characteristic that qualifies OC is the fact that, in order to create
and maintain monopoly power in the territory, OC needs a hierarchical structure
that coordinates its activities. In addition, when we consider economic activities
in illegal markets, OC differs from a set of ordinary illegal firms since OC groups
create a highly integrated economic structure - both vertically and horizontally
- that operates monopolies in various stages of the production and distribution
of illegal commodities.6
The last key feature of OC is the use or threat of violence in order to achieve
a local control and obtain economic advantages. Surprisingly this character-
istic is not universally accepted in literature. In fact, some authors consider
the endogenous emergence of OC and underestimate the role of violence. In
particular, Gambetta (1993) argues that OC operates as a governance structure
mostly addressed to the underworld so that its activities cannot be reduced to
the supply of illegal goods. He suggests that there may be a voluntary demand
for these services and denies the necessary coercive character of the relation-
ships between OC and illegal firms, and affirms that its core business is the
supply of trust, that is of a more stable institutional setting for illegal firms.
In addition, according to the endogenous nature of OC group as part of long-
run non-cooperative equilibria, Skaperdas (2001) proposes a model where OC
groups are (local) suppliers of collective protection and, "providing protection
when the state does not", their presence can be the efficient solution to satisfy
producers demand of protection. From our point of view, even though we would
consider a non-coercitive nature of some relationships between OC groups and
legal firms, we could not deny that violence threat would be used at least for
avoiding cheatings and/or against third-parties.
4Kumar and Skaperdas (2009).
5Fiorentini (2000).
6Traditionally, OC were mainly analyzed through the corporate model based on Weberian
postulates (Cressey, 1972). This model tackles criminal organizations from several formal
traits: centralized and organized hierarchy, clear division of labor, assignment of functions
on the basis of personal ability and formal internal rules. More recently this model has been
extended considering more flexible inner organization and the study of OC has taken a step
forward with the social network analysis (SNA). This method constitutes an alternative way
of looking into the criminal organizations by means of studying the social relationships within
a network, as a form of organization in the midst of an organizational continuum from more
hierarchical and complex organizations to a more horizontal and loosely connected group. See
McIllman (1999), Morselli (2008) and Gimenez-Salinas Framis (2011).
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In order to explain and evaluate the macroeconomic impact of OC we have to
reject the idea that the action of OC is confined solely to illegal or underground
markets, but it interacts with the private and public sectors of the legal economy,
generating substantial income flows to and from the criminal sector. OC plays
as new actor that gets in touch with all the subjects belonging to the legal sector
and significantly modifies the directions and sizes of any income flow.
According to the most studies7 , the presence of criminal organizations in a
given region negatively affects the efficiency of the economic system and tends
to slow economic development. Even though there exists a broad academic
and institutional literature on historical and sociological analysis, on empiri-
cal evidences of crimes and OC groups and on their social cost8 , fewer are the
contributes that tried to estimate the economic impact of OC. Most of them
applied a neoclassical supply-led approach for exploiting inefficient allocations
of resources due to crimes while almost no one, with rare exceptions9 , tried
to construct a demand-led theoretical model for describing and forecasting the
macroeconomic impact of OC on economy. A remarkable example of supply-
oriented analysis is represented by the recent work of Pinotti (2012); over a
thirty-year period, the paper estimates that two southern Italian Regions, Apu-
lia and Basilicata, experience a 16% drop in GDP per capita relative to other
southern regions not significantly exposed to OC. One possible explanation for
this result is the following. The advent of criminal organizations has favored
a decline in private investments connected with an expansion of public invest-
ments, especially through corruption of public officials; therefore, the lower pro-
ductivity of public capital is the main reason that explains the sluggish economic
performance. From the perspective of the supply side, an inefficient allocation of
resources or a reduction of marginal productivity are the key factors that justify
a slowdown in economic growth in the presence of criminal organizations.
Our paper takes a different perspective and assumes that criminal organi-
zations affect the economic system by inducing changes in the level of effective
demand. As illustrated in Figure (1) the presence of OC dramatically changes
the economic structure of a region. The paper assumes the following channels
through which criminal organizations interact with the legal economy. First,
7The estimation of the economic cost of crime has become an important field of study in
the last years. See Felli and Tria (2000) on the effects of OC on productivity in the private
sector, Alleva and Arezzo (2004) that measured total costs of crime both in terms of lost
production and in terms of lost jobs, Centorrino and Ofria (2008) on the relation between OC
and productivity in a Kaldor-Verdoorn context; Peri (2004) and Buonanno et al. (2009) on
the relation between social capital, level of crimes and long-term economic growth; Daniele
and Marani (2008) on the negative impact of crimes on FDI, Detotto and Otranto (2010) on
the short and long term effects of crime on economic growth; Levitt (2001) on the relation
between unemployment and crimes; Daniele (2009) for a survey.
8Anderson (1999) considered that beyond the expenses of the legal system, victim losses,
and crime-prevention agencies, the burden of crime includes the opportunity costs of victims’,
criminals’, and prisoners’ time, the fear of being victimized, and the cost of private deterrence.
See Czabanski (2008) for a survey.
9See Reuter (1983) and (1985); Centorrino and Signorino (1993) and (1997).
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Figure 1: Monetary flows in an economic system where organized crime groups
interact with public and private (legal) sectors.
by trading in criminal goods, extorting of money protection from firms, and
corrupting of public officials, OC leads to income outflows from the legal sector
of the economy; in fact, families can decide to consume criminal goods rather
than legal ones, firms distribute lower revenues to families since they have to
pay money protection to OC in the same way as they have to pay taxes to the
government, the government reduces public expenditure since a share of tax
revenues is diverted to OC. Second, by money laundering, OC leads to income
inflows into the legal sector to the extent that criminal revenues are allocated to
finance legal good consumptions and investments. Third, OC leads to income
outflows from the economy, not only from the legal sector, when criminal rev-
enues are employed to purchase legal or criminal goods outside the region or to
create precautionary criminal income buffers.
In this light, Neo-Kaleckian models of growth and income distribution are
suitable for analyzing how OC affects the operation of the economy through
changes in the aggregate demand level; in fact, in these models, the level of the
economic activity and the growth rate of capital stock are led by the trend of
the effective demand, that is, by consumptions, investments, and public expen-
ditures10 . From this perspective, the presence of OC, on the one hand, tends
to reduce the effective demand draining resources through extortion, bribery of
10Neo-Kaleckian models share with the post Keynesian tradition the principle of effective
demand, they allow to study the role of income distribution in determining economic changes
in accordance with its effects on demand side. For a review of Neo-Kaleckian models see
Blecker (2002).
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public officials and encouraging consumption of criminal assets (illegal goods
and goods produced in the underground economy)11 , on the other hand, tends
to increase the effective demand using the proceeds of criminal activity in the
purchase of legal goods. The model highlights the opposing action of these two
forces and identifies the conditions for a negative impact on the degree of capac-
ity utilization and the growth rate. For the latter variable, these conditions tend
to be more stringent seen the direct impact of crime on investment decisions.
Overall, the operation of OC tends to negatively influence the economic activity
to the extent that the proceeds drained from the legal income are not reused
within the same sector.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we focus on typical crimes
that identify and measure the economic presence of OC while in Section 3 we
illustrate some empirical evidence on the operation of OC in Italian Provinces.
In particular we construct two different indexes of the presence of OC that
measure on the one hand its local control, CILP, and on the other hand its
economic extent, CIEE. In Section 4, we introduce the model setting of our
theoretical analysis where in Section 5 we stress our results in terms of the
degree of capacity utilization and the growth rate. Conclusions are demanded
to Section 6.
2 Economic dimension of Organized Crime:
marker crimes and empirical evidences.
We identify different crimes through which OC affects the legal economy:
the extortion racketeering, the underground or illegal trafficking, the corrup-
tion and the money laundering. From the perspective of criminal organization,
the first three crimes are the key means by which the criminal income is gen-
erated, while the money laundering plays the strategic role of supporting the
enlargement of OC groups on legal sectors. In the following we introduce some
definitions and empirical evidences.
Extortion racketeering. Firms are subject to extortion racketeering and they
must pay protection money if they want to operate in a given region. Extortion
racketeering, where developed in a systemic form, is one of the most frequent
means by which organized criminal groups infiltrate the legitimate economy12 .
According to Monzini (1993) the two main features of the phenomenon may be
extortion-protection, which consists in taxation on a regular basis imposed by
11Criminal economy consists of underground and illegal economies. In fact, according to
OECD (2002) definitions, underground economy consists of productive activities that are legal
but are deliberately concealed from the public authorities to avoid payment of taxes or com-
plying with regulations; instead, illegal economy consists of productive activities that generate
goods and services forbidden by law or that are unlawful when carried out by unauthorized
producers.
12As also remarked in Transcrime (2009), Konrad and Skaperdas (1998) describe extortion
as the “defining activity of organized crime”.
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violent means; labour racketeering, which is violent negotiation for access to the
labour market and employment. A third way, that can be defined as the long-
run strategy, is represented by the so-called monopolistic racketeering, which is
a specific market strategy aimed at the physical elimination of the competitors,
or at the creation of monopolistic coalitions. A recent study on the perceived
dimension of the phenomenon in Italy in 2008 says that 10.9% of businesses in
Italy were worried about being victims of extortion, with a higher value (20%)
for businesses located in the Southern Regions of the country (8.3% in the
North). Moreover, independently of geographical position, the economic sectors
most concerned about being victims of extortion racketeering were hotels and
catering, and the commercial and retail sector. A recent report13 by the Italian
business trade group, Confesercenti, said that extortion racketeering represents
a turnover for Italian OC groups of more that €21billion, about the 15% of its
total turnover, second only to the revenues from illegal drug traffic.
Trafficking in illegal markets. Families may buy legal goods produced in
the legal economy; but they may also buy goods produced in the underground
and illegal economies, enriching criminal organization to the extent that they
control these productions. Focusing only on illegal goods, as anticipated before,
the revenues from drug traffics is the most important activity of OC in Italy with
a turnover of about 60€billion while the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
of the Group of Seven leading industrial nations (G7) has recently estimated
that the drugs business is the third biggest economy in the world today and
that the annual value of the worldwide trade in illegal drugs ranges between
1200€billion to 4000€billion14 . Drug trafficking15 remains the most common
form of transnational OC in the EU and the role of Italy is crucial since the
country represents an important gateway for and consumer of Latin American
cocaine and Southwest Asian heroin entering the European market.
Corruption. Also the Public Sector is directly and indirectly affected by the
presence of OC groups. The government makes public expenditures financed
through tax revenues; even if we do not consider that the presence of OC affects
13Rapporto SOS Imprese (2011).
14The independent, "Drugs trade ‘the third largest economy’ ", newspaper article,
16th may 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/drugs-trade-the-third-largest-economy-
1072489.html.
15When we consider drug trafficking (that is, illegal possession, cultivation, production,
supplying, transportation, importing, exporting and financing of drugs operations) we mainly
focus on illicit drugs like cocaine, heroin, synthetic drugs, cannabis resin (hashish) and herbal
cannabis (marijuana). With respect to European Union Member States a study conducted
by the commission in 2010 says that drug trafficking has generally been increasing steadily
since 2002. This trend slowed over the period 2005 to 2008, with the total number of offences
remaining fairly stable, but there were considerable variations between countries. Increases
of about a half were observed in Sweden, Romania and Slovenia. Less marked, but still
substantial, rises took place in Cyprus, Spain, Denmark, Greece and the United Kingdom
(particularly in Northern Ireland).
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legal sector income and tax revenue16 , only the corruption17 of public officials
may raise public good costs, redirecting public resources in favour of criminal
organizations. Empirical evidence confirms that the phenomenon of corrup-
tion is deeply correlated with public expenditure. In particular, Del Monte and
Papagni (2007) and Acconcia and Cantabene (2008) confirm the positive corre-
lation between corruption and crime indexes and between corruption index and
public expenditure in Italy in the last decades18 .
Money Laundering. Investing illegal or criminal income in the legal sec-
tor represents the main way for cleaning dirty money. The phenomenon called
money laundering plays a relevant role in development strategies of OC groups.
In fact, money represents the lifeblood of the organization that engages in crim-
inal conduct for financial gain because it covers operating expenses, replenishes
inventories, purchases the services of corrupt officials to escape detection and fur-
ther the interests of the illegal enterprise, and pays for an extravagant lifestyle.
To spend money in these ways, criminals must make the money they derived
illegally appear legitimate. Moreover, a trail of money from an offense to crim-
inals can become incriminating evidence. Criminals must obscure or hide the
source of their wealth or alternatively disguise ownership or control to ensure
that illicit proceeds are not used to prosecute them. According to Schneider
(2009), the worldwide turnover generated by criminal operations reached a size
of 1300 in 1998 to 2100US$billion in 2003 and, of course, are the object for
money laundering processes. Some authors like Agarwal and Agarwal (2006)
estimate even a higher figure, from 2000 to 2500US$billion in 2005, or Walker
(2007), up to 3000US$billion.
16Moreover, Centorrino and Signorino (1997) affirm that the presence of OC causes a "fiscal
gap" in tax revenues not only for the impact of criminal activities on legal income, but also
for the increase of tax evasion when firms have to pay a criminal tax (racketeering) too.
17Spencer et al. (2006) describe corruption as "many kinds of irregular influence, the objec-
tive of which is to allow the participants to make profits they are not entitled to; the method
being the breaking of internal or external rules". Notice that corruption has long been con-
sidered one of the defining characteristics of organized crime. As comprehensive reviews of
organized crime definitions include corruption as a defining element (see Finckenauer 2005;
Hagan 2006).
18Del Monte and Papagni (2007) investigate the determinants of corruption in Italy in the
period 1963—2001 using statistics on crimes against the public administration at a regional
level. Their estimates show that economic variables (government consumption, level of de-
velopment) and political and cultural influences (party concentration, presence of voluntary
organizations, absenteeism at national elections) significantly affect corruption in Italy. More
recently, Acconcia and Cantabene (2008) test the hypothesis of strong correlation between
corruption and public expenditure in Italy. Their analysis conclude that during the 1980s and
the first half of the 1990s corruption in Italy, at least in part, fed on the huge amounts of pub-
lic spending in social infrastructure, such as buildings, swamp and land reclamation, as well
as public spending in social security; while, the perverse relationship between corruption and
public spending collapsed just after the prosecutions and convictions related to Mani Pulite.
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3 The presence of organized crime in Italy.
The statistical analysis of criminal organizations is by its nature very com-
plex, since we are witnessing the overlap of two complementary dimensions, a
social and an economic one. In this section, starting from official statistics on
crimes reported, we try to measure the different intensity of the two components
in the Italian Provinces.
We analyze the criminal statistics for Italy produced by the Italian National
Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) on a provincial basis (NUTS 3 level adminis-
trative units), and we reconstruct the activities of criminal organizations by
distinguishing between (i) offenses or crimes that are being made to obtain and
maintain control of the territory (the local power of OC) and (ii) offenses and
crimes that measure their presence in legal and illegal markets (the economic
extent of OC). These two dimensions, the first local and the second global,
have suggested the use by some authors of the term "glocal" to indicate the
geographical space of action of OC. This distinction arises from the will to sep-
arately measure what Block (1980) respectively called "power syndicate" and
"enterprise syndicate" of criminal groups.19
Indeed, we build two composite indexes, which we call "composite index
of local presence" (CILP) and "composite index of economic extent" (CIEE) of
criminal organizations, starting from the data of offences and crimes reported by
victims to the police20 . These data are collected by ISTAT on a provincial basis
and we compute for any selected crime the average number of offences reported
in the period 2008-2010 on 10000 inhabitants21 . Then, for any selected crime
we compute the z-score on the theoretical normal-shaped national population.
In this way we obtain ordinal and comparable crime-to-crime indexes. The next
step is to construct the two composite indexes as the average z-score of all the
crimes used to represent any single dimension of OC activities.
More precisely, in order to identify the composite index of local presence
(CILP) of OC we considered the statistics of the following offenses: Mafia mur-
ders and attempted Mafia murders, Mafia-type criminal associations, extortions,
damages, arsons and damages followed by arsons, bodily injuries, city councils
(LAU 2 administrative units) dissolved for infiltration by OC, assets and firms
confiscated from OC. All these crimes can be considered either as instrumental
to rule and control the territory or as a manifestation of the same power of OC.
Regarding to the composite index of economic extent (CIEE) of OC, we con-
sidered the statistics of the following offenses: exploitation of prostitution, drug
production and trafficking, theft and robbery, computer fraud, counterfeiting,
19For a deep analysis of the two aspects see Sciarrone (1998).
20We are aware that the data can be characterized by systematic bias, overestimating the
presence of criminal organizations in those provinces where the victims were simply less afraid
to report to and/or more confident in the police. However, we are also aware that there is not
another source of data for Italy more detailed and less distorted.
21The data are available for the 103 provinces operating in 2008. The decision of focusing
on a so short period of time (three years) is justify by the will to avoid structural breaks in
the series due to political, legal, social or economic factors.
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Figure 2: the composite index of local presence (CILP) of Organized Crime.
Our elaboration on ISTAT data (2008-2010).
smuggling of goods, money laundering, usury and criminal associations. The
listed crimes refer to economic activities of OC in legal and illegal markets.
In Figure (2) we find the per-quartile map of the composite index of local
presence (CILP)22 . As indicated by the darker color, with some exceptions such
as Turin, Imperia or Latina, the index assumes higher value in the provinces of
Southern Italy, where traditionally we measure the presence of criminal organi-
zations.
Analogously, in Figure (3) we find the per-quartile map of the composite
index of economic extent (CIEE)23 . As indicated by the darker color, the index
assumes higher value not only in the provinces of Southern Italy but also in the
Center and in the North where a more prosperous economy incentives criminal
organizations investments. Notice that rich provinces as Turin, Milan, Brescia,
Genoa, Savona and Rimini belong to the last quartile (the most criminal one)
of the CIEE distribution.
22 In Appendix II, Figures (5) and (6) show in tables the values of the criminal statistics
and the composite index of local presence (CILP) of OC for provinces.
23 In Appendix II, in Figures (7) and (8) there are in tables the values of the z-score of
the criminal statistics used and the composite index of economic extent (CIEE) of OC for
provinces.
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Figure 3: the composite index of economic extent (CIEE) of Organized Crime.
Our elaboration on ISTAT data (2008-2010).
The two composite indexes, CILP and CIEE, represent two complementary
aspects of the activities of criminal organizations. With reference to the scatter
plot between the two indexes24 in Figure (4), we can try to classify Italian
provinces in four groups or categories:
(a) provinces such as Treviso, Rovigo, Trento, Pordenone, Belluno, etc., mostly
in northern Italy, where both indexes are characterized by relative low
values (both negative);
(b) provinces such as Naples, Caserta, Reggio Calabria, Foggia, Brindisi, Cata-
nia, etc., in which both the indexes are relative high (both positive);
(c) provinces such as Milan, Venice, Rimini, Imperia, etc., which are charac-
terized by low values of the CILP, but high values of the CIEE (the first
negative or close to zero, the second positive);
(d) provinces such as Ragusa, Agrigento, Messina, Crotone, Enna, etc., where
we face high values of the CILP together with low values of the CIEE (the
first positive, the second negative or close to zero).
24Correlations between the two indexes for macroregions are presented in Appendix. Just
watching the graph seems to be that different relations hold between the two indexes in the
first quadrant (maybe a negative relation when both indexes are positive) and in the third
one (maybe a positive relation when both index are negative). This aspect requires a deep
analysis that surely will be part of a further development of our work.
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Provinces belonging to category (a) are those with a negligible OC presence
in their territory and characterized by a low risk of criminal infiltration in their
economic system.
Provinces belonging to categories (b) and (d) are those with traditionally
high OC presence. The former, relatively richer than the latter, face the en-
trepreneurial activities of OC in legal and illegal markets, while the latter are
characterized by relatively underdeveloped economies in which criminal organi-
zations do not have room for their investments.
Provinces belonging to category (c) are those with traditionally low or neg-
ligible OC presence. Nevertheless, criminal organizations are increasingly in-
vesting in these provinces where the richness of the local economy creates high
demand of illegal markets. Historically we can say that criminal organizations
in Italy are born in the provinces of categories (b) and (d) but have spread,
recently and increasingly, in provinces of category (c).
Clearly, the explanation of the timing and causes of spread of criminal or-
ganizations, outside the territorial contexts where they were born, requires a
more rigorous analysis, econometric type, which will surely be part of a future
development of this work.
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Figure 4: Scatter plot of CILP (on the Y-axis) and CIEE (on the X-axis). Our
elaboration on ISTAT data (2008-2010).
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4 The model.
The model analyzes how the operation of OC affects the economy through
changes in the aggregate demand level; in particular, the focus is on crimes as
extortion, trading in criminal goods, corruption of public officials, and money
laundering, which are strictly connected with the social and economic dimen-
sions of OC. The model describes an economy where a legal sector and a criminal
sector interact. The legal sector produces the legal income (Yl); in this sector
families allocate their disposable income to savings or consumptions of legal
and criminal goods, firms undertake investments, and the government provides
public goods financed through tax revenues. The criminal sector, which is ruled
by OC, produces the criminal income (Yc); in this sector criminals extort money
protection from firms, trading in criminal goods, corrupt public officials in order
to obtain a share of tax revenues, and launder money in legal activities. Thus,
the criminal income comes from extortion revenues, sale proceeds of criminal
goods, and corruption revenues; moreover, criminals allocate their illegal income
to savings or consumptions of criminal goods and, through the money launder-
ing, to legal activities as consumptions or investments. Both the production
and allocation of the illegal income affect the legal sector of the economy: the
first determines legal income outflows, while the second determines legal income
inflows. OC, on the one hand, supports an effective demand decrease through
extortion revenues, consumptions of criminal goods made by families, and cor-
ruption revenues; on the other hand, it supports an effective demand increase
through its legal consumptions and investments.
The legal sector of the economy produces only one legal good, which can be
used as a consumption good, an investment good, or a public good. The model
assumes that the legal income level is determined by the effective demand level,
that is, it is equal to legal consumptions (Cl), legal investments (Il), and public
expenditures (G). Equation (1) describes the legal income determination:
Yl = Cl + Il +G (1)
Cl = C
f
l +C
c
l = (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)Yl + βlYc (2)
Il = I
f
l + I
c
l (3)
G = τYl (1− αc) (4)
Equation (2) defines Cl as legal good consumptions made by families
(
C
f
l
)
and criminals, (Ccl ): C
f
l is a linear function of the legal income, net of extortion
and tax payments, (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)Yl, where c ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter
denoting the propensity to consume legal and criminal goods out of the legal
disposable income, and cc ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter denoting family preferences
for criminal goods; Ccl is a linear function of the criminal income, βlYc, where
βl ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter denoting the propensity to consume legal goods out
of the criminal income. In equation (2), families choose the income share to save,
and then they allocate their residual income to legal and criminal consumptions;
14
instead, criminals directly chooses the income share allocated to legal consump-
tions. As the seminal paper of Kaldor (1966) assumes different propensity to
consume out of wages and profits, likewise this paper assume different propen-
sity to consume out of legal and criminal income; the main reason for this is
the money laundering role, this activity affects only the propensity to consume
out of the criminal income, and not that one out of the legal income. Equa-
tion (3) defines Il as legal investments made by firms
(
I
f
l
)
, and that one made
by criminals (Icl ). Equation (4) defines G as a linear function of tax revenues,
(1− αc) τYl, where αc ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter denoting the tax revenue share
distorted in favour of OC, and τ is the parameter denoting the tax rate; the
government works with a balanced budget, but only a fraction of tax revenues
becomes public expenditures because OC embezzles of a share of tax revenues
through public official corruption, thereby 1 unit of tax revenues is necessary to
provide 1− αc unit of public expenditures.
The criminal sector, which is ruled by OC, produces the criminal income
through extortion, trading in criminal goods, and corruption; therefore, the
criminal income consists of extortion revenues (ER), trading revenues (TR),
and corruption revenues (CR). Equation (5) describes the criminal income
production:
Yc = ER+ TR+CR (5)
ER = αeYl (6)
TR = αtCc = αt
(
Cfc +C
c
c
)
= αt [(1− αe − τ) cccYl + βtYc] (7)
CR = αcτYl (8)
Equation (6) defines ER as a linear function of the legal income, αeYl, since
the protection money is fixed as a given share of the legal income. Equation (7)
shows that TR come from the sale of criminal goods, αtCc, where Cc defines
criminal good consumptions made by families, Cfc , and criminals, C
c
c , while
αt ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter denoting the profit margin obtained by marketing
criminal goods; in fact, we assume that OC does not produce these goods, but
it only retails criminal goods purchased abroad. Cfc is a linear function of the
legal income, net of extortion and tax payments, (1− αe − τ) cccYl, and C
c
c is a
linear function of the criminal income, βtYc, where βt ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter
denoting the propensity to consume criminal goods out of the criminal income.
Finally, equation (8) defines CR as a share of tax payments, αcτYl, obtained
through the corruption of public officials.
Families can allocate their legal disposable income, that is, the legal income
net of tax and extortion payments, to consumptions, both of legal or criminal
goods, or to savings (Sf ). Equations (9-10) describe the legal income allocation:
Yl = T +E +C
f
l +C
f
c + Sf (9)
Yl = τYl + αeYl + (1− αe − τ) cYl + (1− αe − τ) (1− c)Yl (10)
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OC can allocate its criminal income to legal and criminal good consump-
tions, legal investments, or savings (Sc). Equation (11-12) describe the criminal
income allocation:
Yc = (C
c
l +C
c
c + I
c
l ) + Sc (11)
Yc = (βl + βt + βh)Yc + [1− (βl + βt + βh)]Yc (12)
Sc defines the share of the criminal income that does not come back neither
into the legal sector of the economy through legal consumptions and invest-
ments nor into the criminal sector through criminal consumptions; note that
the following condition holds: 1 > βl + βt + βh, where βh ∈ [0, 1] is the pa-
rameter denoting the propensity to invest out of the criminal income in legal
activities, thereby OC always saves a positive share of the criminal income and
an increase in βl, βt, and βh decreases this share. OC savings consist of crimi-
nal income buffers held for precautionary purposes; in fact, the working life of
criminals tend to be very short, as they may be arrested by police or killed by
other criminals, so they try to protect their families by laying up these buffers.
Moreover, launder money in the legal sector involves considerable risk because if
the criminal income flows are identified criminals may be subject, in addition to
the arrest, to the judicial attachment of their assets. As mentioned before, OC
has a twofold dimension: one local and one global. The first is defined by the
control of a given region, and it is closely related to crimes as extortion, corrup-
tion, and, to a lesser extent, trading in criminal goods and money laundering.
The second is defined by investments in legal and illegal activities outside the
ruled region, and it is closely related to crime as trading in criminal goods and
money laundering. In general, the global dimension can imply criminal income
outflows or inflows; in this paper, the focus is on the local dimension, thereby
the global dimension only takes into account criminal good imports.
Equations (11-12) also allow to explain how we deal with money laundering
within the model. Masciandaro (2007) defines money laundering as an activ-
ity whose economic function is to transform the criminal income into effective
purchasing power. Given the perspective taken in this paper with the emphasis
placed on the effective demand role, on the one hand, money laundering costs
can only be criminal good consumptions or legal good consumptions and invest-
ments; on the other hand, the money laundered can only be allocated to legal
consumptions and investments; in this light, the parameters βl and βh denote
the criminal income share laundered into the region.
As normal in a Neo-Kaleckian framework, the model assumes a production
function with fixed coefficients, the effective legal output is always less than the
potential legal output obtainable by the existing capital stock. Inequality (13)
describes the production function:
Yl =
Yl
L
L = alL ≤ akK =
Yp
K
K = Yp (13)
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Where L defines the labour employment, K defines the capital stock, Yp
defines the potential output, al is the parameter denoting the reciprocal of the
labour input coefficient, and ak is the parameter denoting the reciprocal of the
capital input coefficient.
4.1 The relationship between legal and criminal income.
OC draws the criminal income from extortion, trading in illegal or underground
productions, and corruption; on this assumption, we come to the following state-
ment.
Proposition 1 The criminal income is a liner function of the legal income; in
particular, the criminal income is a fixed share of the legal income. OC, to the
extent that rules the criminal sector of the economy, draws a rent from the legal
sector.
Proof. By algebraic manipulation of equation (5) presented in Appendix, it is
possible to obtain the following result:
Yc
Yl
= ε =
[αe + αt (1− αe − τ) ccc + αcτ ]
(1− αtβt)
(14)
According to equation (14), the ratio between the criminal and legal income
depends on the extortion rate, the profit margin on criminal good trade, the
tax rate, the propensities to consume out of the legal and criminal income, and
the tax revenue share distorted in favour of OC.
Corollary 2 The ratio between the legal income and the criminal income is a
positive function of the extortion rate, the profit margin on criminal good trade,
the tax revenue share distorted in favour of OC, and the propensities to consume
out of the legal and criminal income; while it can be positively or negatively
related to the tax rate.
Proof. In Appendix.
A change in αe has twofold impact on the criminal income: on the one
hand, it has a direct impact proportional to the legal income; on the other
hand, it has an indirect impact proportional to criminal good consumptions
made by families; the first effect is greater than the second and the net im-
pact is amplified by the criminal income multiplier,
(
1
1−αtβt
)
. A change in
αt modifies the criminal income multiplier,
(
1
1−αtβt
)
, and raises the impact of
criminal good consumptions made by families, ((1− αe − τ) ccc), and criminals,
(βt (αe + αcτ)). A change in αc has an impact proportional to tax payments
(τ). A change in βt modifies the criminal income multiplier
(
1
1−αtβt
)
, that
is, it amplifies the impact of a given resource distortion from the legal sector
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(
αt
[
αe + αt (1− αe − τ) c
lclc + αcτ
])
. A change in c or in cc affects the criminal
income by increase or decrease the criminal good consumption made by families
(αt (1− αe − τ) ccorαt (1− αe − τ) c). Since corruption revenues are positively
related to τ and criminal good consumptions made by families are inversely re-
lated to τ , the net impact of a change in this parameter depends on the balance
(outweigh) of these two effect (αc − αtccc).
5 The impact of OC on the degree of capacity
utilization and the growth rate.
In order to analyze how OC affects the economic activity level and the
growth process, we need to specify an investment function. With regard to
investments undertaken by firms, we refer to the classical neo-Kaleckian invest-
ment function, with the investment demand in terms of capital stock that is
positively related to the economic activity level. Equation (15) describes the
investment function:
I
f
l
K
= gfi,l = γ + γuu (15)
Firms’ investment decisions are a function of the ratio between the effec-
tive legal income and the potential legal income, that is, the degree of capacity
utilization
(
u = yl
yp
)
, and γu is the parameter denoting the sensitivity of invest-
ment decisions to it; γ is the parameter denoting the impact of other factors
not related to the economic activity level.
In the legal sector saving decisions are taken by families and investment
decisions are taken by firms and OC; such decisions are brought into balance,
whereby savings equal investments, through changes in the degree of capacity
utilization. On these assumptions, we come to the following statement
Proposition 3 The equilibrium solution for the degree of capacity utilization
is affected by the behavior of families, firms, and the government; moreover, the
degree of capacity utilization is also affected by the criminal income production
and allocation, that is, by the behavior of OC.
Proof. By algebraic manipulation of Equations (1) and (9) that describe the
legal income production and allocation, as presented in Appendix, we obtain
u =
γ
[1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (βl + βh) ε− τ (1− αc)] ak − γu
(16)
Equation (16) confirms the classical result of the neo-Kaleckian model of
growth: the degree of capacity utilization is a positive function of the demand
level, which is supported by consumptions, investments, and public expendi-
tures. OC, on the one hand, reduces the demand level through extortion, trad-
ing of criminal goods, and corruption of public officials; on the other hand, it
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raises the demand level through the criminal income allocation to consumptions
and investments; therefore, the net effect depends on the parameter values.
Corollary 4 The degree of capacity utilization is positively related to αt, βl,
βt, βh, and c; while the impact of αe, αc, cc, and τ is uncertain.
Proof. In Appendix.
In general, the impact of OC operation on the degree of capacity utiliza-
tion tends to be negative when the criminal income allocation does not support
(promote) the effective demand enough, that is, when βl and βh tend to zero.
An increase in αe and αc negatively affect u to the extent that the increase
in consumptions and investments made by OC (respectively, (βl + βh)
∂ε
∂αe
and
(βl + βh)
∂ε
∂αc
) does not offset the reduction in family consumption and gov-
ernment public expenditures (respectively, c (1− cc) and τ). An increase in αt
and βt, has always a positive effect on u because of its impact on the criminal
income multiplier. An increase in cc has a positive effect on the u only if the
decrease in the legal good consumption made by families, (1− αe − τ) c, is offset
by the increase in investments and consumptions made by OC, (βl + βh)
∂ε
∂cc
.
The impact of a change in the government size is more complex; an increase in
τ positively affects u to the extent that the increase in public expenditures net
of corruption revenues, (1− αc), and that one in investments and consumptions
made by OC, (βl + βh)
∂ε
∂cc
, is greater than the reduction in consumptions made
by families.
Proposition 5 The equilibrium solution for the growth rate is a direct function
of the degree of capacity utilization; OC affects the growth rate in two ways:
indirectly, through its impact on the degree of capacity utilization and, directly,
through its investment decisions.
Proof. By substituting the equilibrium solution for the degree of capacity uti-
lization in equation (15) and taking into account also investments in terms of
capital made by OC:
gi =
I
f
l
K
+
Icl
K
= gfi,l + g
c
i,l = γ + γuu+ βhakεu
g∗ = γ + (γu + βhakε)u
∗
g∗ = γ +
(γu + βhakε) γ
[1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (1− αc) τ − βlε] ak − γu
(17)
Equation (17) describes how the growth process is driven by the effective
demand, that is, by the degree of capacity utilization.
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Corollary 6 As the degree of capacity utilization, the growth rate g∗ is pos-
itively related to αt, βl, βt, βh, and c. The impact of αe, αc, cc, and τ is
uncertain, but the conditions that imply a positive effect are less constraining
than those which refer to the degree of capacity utilization.
Proof. In Appendix.
The previous corollary confirms the framework come out about the degree
of capacity utilization. The parameters αt, βt, βl, βh, and c, all have a positive
impact on the growth rate because they are positively related to the legal and
criminal income; moreover, βh strengthens these effects to the extent that it
increases the share of the criminal income allocated to legal investments. The
parameters cc, τ , αe, and αc, negatively affect the growth rate only if the po-
tential negative impact on the legal income, that is, on the degree of capacity
utilization, offsets the positive impact on the criminal income, that is, on in-
vestments coming from the criminal income.
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6 Conclusions.
The paper introduces a Neo-Kaleckian model for describing the macroeco-
nomic impact of the presence of organized crime. The evaluations in terms of
income level, capacity utilization and growth rate are not unambiguous since
the presence of OC, on the one hand, tends to reduce the effective demand
draining resources through extortion, bribery of public officials and encouraging
consumption of criminal assets (illegal goods and goods produced in the under-
ground economy), on the other hand, tends to increase the effective demand
using the proceeds of criminal activity in the purchase of legal goods and in-
vestment goods. The model allows highlight the opposing action of these two
forces and to identify the conditions for a negative impact on the utilization of
productive capacity and growth rate. For the latter variable, these conditions
tend to be more stringent seen the direct impact of crime on the rate of in-
vestment growth. Overall, the operation of organized crime tends to negatively
influence the economic activity to the extent that the income drained from the
legal sector is not reused into the same sector.
ε u∗ g∗
αe positive positive/negative positive/negative
αt positive positive positive
αc positive positive/negative positive/negative
βt positive positive positive
βl none positive positive
βh none positive positive
c positive positive positive
cc positive positive/negative positive/negative
τ positive/negative positive/negative positive/negative
According to the proposed theoretical model, as reported in the previous
table, we can summarize our results as follows:
- The ratio between the legal income and the criminal income ε is a positive
function of the extortion rate αe, the profit margin on criminal good trade αt,
the tax revenue share distorted in favour of OC αc, and the propensities to
consume out of the legal and criminal income βt; while it can be positively or
negatively related to the tax rate τ .
- The degree of capacity utilization u∗ is positively related to the profit
margin on criminal good tradeαt, the propensities to consume βl, βt and βh,
and c; while the impact of αe, αc, cc, and τ is uncertain.
- The growth rate g∗ is positively related to αt, βl, βt, βh, and c. The impact
of αe, αc, cc, and τ is uncertain, but the conditions implying a positive effect
are less constraints than those which refer to the degree of capacity utilization.
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From a theoretical point of view a further development of our analysis is
represented by the elaboration of a two-region model where the operation of
OC implies legal and criminal income flows across regions; in this case, the
level of economic activity in both regions is affected by ties arising out of the
interaction between the legal sectors of the economy. From an empirical point of
view an interesting development is the elaboration of a statistical methodology
in order to describe the main features of the operation of organized crime in a
given region; in particular, this methodology should be based on the distinction
the social and economic dimension of OC.
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Appendix I
Proof of Proposition 1. By algebraic manipulation of equation (5), it is
possible to obtain the following result:
Yc = (αeYl) + {αt [(1− αe − τ) cccYl + βtYc]}+ (αcτYl)
Yc = αeYl + αt (1− αe − τ) cccYl + αtβtYc + αcτYl
Yc − αtβtYc = αeYl + αt (1− αe − τ)Ylccc + αcτYl
Yc (1− αtβt) = [αe + αt (1− αe − τ) ccc + αcτ ]Yl
Yc =
[αe + αt (1− αe − τ) ccc + αcτ ]
(1− αtβt)
Yl
Proof of Corollary 1.By differentiating equation (14)with respect to αe,
αt, αc, βt, c, cc, and τ it is possible to obtain the following results:
∂ε
∂αe
=
1
(1− αtβt)
(1− αtccc) ≥ 0
∂ε
∂αt
=
(1− αe − τ) ccc (1− αtβt)− (−βt) [αe + αt (1− αe − τ) ccc + αcτ ]
(1− αtβt)
2
∂ε
∂αt
=
(1− αe − τ) ccc + βt (αe + αcτ)
(1− αtβt)
2
≥ 0
∂ε
∂αc
=
τ
(1− αtβt)
≥ 0
∂ε
∂βt
=
αt
[
αe + αt (1− αe − τ) clclc + αcτ
]
(1− αtβt)
2
≥ 0
∂ǫ
∂c
=
αt (1− αe − τ) cc
(1− αtβt)
≥ 0
∂ǫ
∂cc
=
αt (1− αe − τ) c
(1− αtβt)
≥ 0
∂ε
∂τ
=
αc − αtccc
(1− αtβt)
≥ 0 if αc ≥ αtccc
Proof of Proposition 3 By algebraic manipulation of Equations (1) and
(9) that describe the legal income production and allocation we obtain
Yl =
(
C
f
l + C
c
l
)
+G+
(
I
f
l + I
c
l
)
⇒ Yl −C
f
l = C
c
l +G+
(
I
f
l + I
c
l
)
Yl = T +E +C
f
l +C
f
c + Sf ⇒ Yl −C
f
l = T +E +C
f
c + Sf
Ccl +G+
(
I
f
l + I
c
l
)
= T +E +Cfc + Sf
βlYc + τYl (1− αc) +
(
I
f
l + I
c
l
)
= τYl + αeYl + (1− αe − τ) cccYl + (1− αe − τ) (1− c)Yl
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(
Ifl + I
c
l
)
= τYl + αeYl + (1− αe − τ) cccYl + (1− αe − τ) (1− c)Yl − βlYc − τYl (1− αc)(
I
f
l + I
c
l
)
= (1− αe − τ) cccYl + τYl + αeYl + (1− αe − τ)Yl − (1− αe − τ) c− βlYc − τYl (1− αc)
(18)(
I
f
l + I
c
l
)
= (1− αe − τ) cccYl + Yl − (1− αe − τ) cYl − βlεYl − τYl (1− αc)(
I
f
l + βhεYl
)
= Yl + (1− αe − τ) cccYl − (1− αe − τ) cYl − βlεYl − τYl (1− αc)
I
f
l = Yl − (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)Yl − βlεYl − βhεYl − τYl (1− αc)
Ifl = [1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (βl + βh) ε− τ (1− αc)]Yl
I
f
l
K
= [1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (βl + βh) ε− τ (1− αc)]
Yl
K
Yp
Yp
gi = [1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (βl + βh) ε− τ (1− αc)] aku
γ + γuu = [1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (βl + βh) ε− τ (1− αc)] aku
u =
γ
[1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (βl + βh) ε− τ (1− αc)] ak − γu
Proof of Corollary 4 By differentiating equation (16) with respect to αe,
αt, αc, βt, βl, βh, c, cc, and τ , it is possible to obtain the following results:
∂u
∂αe
=
−
[
c (1− cc)− (βl + βh)
∂ε
∂αe
]
akγ
{[1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (1− αc) τ − βlε] ak − γu}
2
≥ 0
if (βl + βh)
∂ε
∂αe
− c (1− cc) ≥ 0
∂u
∂αt
=
(
(βl + βh)
∂ε
∂αe
)
akγ
{[1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (1− αc) τ − βlε] ak − γu}
2
≥ 0
∂u
∂αc
=
−
[
τ − (βl + βh)
∂ε
∂αe
]
akγ
{[1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (1− αc) τ − βlε] ak − γu}
2
≥ 0
if (βl + βh)
∂ε
∂αc
− τ ≥ 0
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∂u
∂βt
=
[
(βl + βh)
∂ε
∂βt
]
akγ
{[1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (1− αc) τ − βlε] ak − γu}
2
≥ 0
∂u
∂βh
=
(ε) akγ
{[1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (1− αc) τ − βlε] ak − γu}
2
≥ 0
∂u
∂βl
=
(ε) akγ
{[1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (1− αc) τ − βlε] ak − γu}
2
≥ 0
∂u
∂c
=
[
(1− αe − τ) (1− cc) + (βl + βh)
∂ε
∂c
]
akγ
{[1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (1− αc) τ − βlε] ak − γu}
2
≥ 0
∂u
∂cc
=
−
[
(1− αe − τ) c− (βl + βh)
∂ε
∂cc
]
akγ
{[1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (1− αc) τ − βlε] ak − γu}
2
≥ 0
if (βl + βh)
∂ε
∂cc
− (1− αe − τ) c ≥ 0
∂u
∂τ
=
−
[
c (1− cc)− (1− αc)− (βl + βh)
∂ε
∂τ
]
akγ
{[1− (1− αe − τ) c (1− cc)− (1− αc) τ − βlε]ak − γu}
2
≥ 0
if (βl + βh)
∂ε
∂τ
+ (1− αc)− c (1− cc) ≥ 0
Proof of Corollary 6. By differentiating equation (17) with respect to αe,
αt, αc, βt, βl, βh, c, cc, and τ , it is possible to obtain the following results:
∂g∗
∂αe
= γu
∂u∗
∂αe
+ βhak
(
ε
∂u∗
∂αe
+ u∗
∂ε
∂αe
)
≶ 0
∂g∗
∂αt
= γu
∂u∗
∂αt
+ βhak
(
ε
∂u∗
∂αt
+ u∗
∂ε
∂αt
)
≥ 0
∂g∗
∂αc
= γu
∂u∗
∂αc
+ βhak
(
ε
∂u∗
∂αc
+ u∗
∂ε
∂αc
)
≶ 0
∂g∗
∂βt
= γu
∂u∗
∂βt
+ βhak
(
ε
∂u∗
∂βt
+ u∗
∂ε
∂βt
)
≥ 0
∂g∗
∂βh
= γu
∂u∗
∂βh
+ βhak
(
ε
∂u∗
∂βh
+ u∗
ε
βh
)
≥ 0
∂g∗
∂βl
= γu
∂u∗
∂βl
+ βhakε
∂u∗
∂βl
≥ 0
∂g∗
∂c
= γu
∂u∗
∂c
+ βhak
(
ε
∂u∗
∂c
+ u∗
∂ε
∂c
)
≥ 0
∂g∗
∂cc
= γu
∂u∗
∂cc
+ βhak
(
ε
∂u∗
∂cc
+ u∗
∂ε
∂cc
)
≶ 0
∂g∗
∂τ
= γu
∂u∗
∂τ
+ βhak
(
ε
∂u∗
∂τ
+ u∗
∂ε
∂τ
)
≶ 0
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Appendix II
# Italian Provinces R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 CILP
1 Torino -0.32063 -0.41577 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.22784 -0.14786 1.1839 0.00342 0.551042 0.042166
2 Vercelli -0.3476 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.12835 -0.14786 0.761825 -0.64752 0 -0.14128
3 Novara -0.38705 -0.44628 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.180953 -0.14786 1.219723 -0.46166 0 -0.03211
4 Verbano-Cusio-Ossola -0.27127 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.93963 -0.14786 1.302783 -0.62071 0 -0.15986
5 Cuneo -0.39648 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.61715 -0.14786 -0.70305 -0.5863 0 -0.35699
6 Biella -0.42487 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.919705 -0.14786 0.799803 -0.71602 0 -0.03681
7 Asti -0.33665 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.62839 -0.14786 -0.35499 -0.4414 0 -0.29681
8 Alessandria -0.40587 -0.39973 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.03854 -0.14786 0.527107 -0.53867 0 -0.13893
9 Aosta -0.42487 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -1.07855 -0.14786 1.307132 -0.45549 0 -0.17352
10 Varese -0.29443 -0.39919 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.55579 -0.14786 -0.44756 -0.48526 0 -0.28632
11 Como -0.2213 -0.08346 -0.10832 -0.13845 -1.092 -0.14786 -2.04834 -0.50247 0 -0.48247
12 Lecco -0.11098 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.98125 -0.14786 -1.45572 -0.29221 0 -0.41667
13 Sondrio -0.36388 2.12696 -0.10832 -0.13845 -1.44239 -0.14786 0.324605 -0.3739 0 -0.01369
14 Milano -0.12896 0.230167 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.13698 -0.09526 0.323908 -0.37334 0 -0.04747
15 Lodi -0.4125 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.72188 -0.14786 -0.83818 -0.66726 0 -0.39441
16 Bergamo -0.37601 -0.49181 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.69576 -0.14786 -0.16445 -0.6453 0 -0.30755
17 Brescia -0.26969 -0.28963 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.36454 -0.14786 0.646094 -0.53763 0 -0.13445
18 Pavia -0.3068 -0.3748 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.89558 -0.14786 -0.82121 -0.345 0 -0.34867
19 Cremona -0.40947 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -1.12946 -0.14786 -0.28728 -0.55875 0 -0.3661
20 Mantova -0.39105 -0.45358 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.66718 -0.14786 -0.93035 -0.58349 0 -0.38003
21 Bolzano/Bozen -0.42487 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -1.30568 -0.14786 -0.17655 -0.43375 0 -0.36119
22 Trento -0.33968 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -1.06756 -0.14786 -0.36686 -0.49731 0 -0.35348
23 Verona -0.35775 -0.48744 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.90271 -0.14786 0.326261 -0.65135 0 -0.27418
24 Vicenza -0.41843 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -1.18384 -0.14786 -1.07039 -0.49872 0 -0.45348
25 Belluno -0.29489 -0.39671 -0.10832 -0.13845 -1.36239 -0.14786 -0.50127 -0.7658 0 -0.41285
26 Treviso -0.41856 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -1.39782 -0.14786 -2.21394 -0.63838 0 -0.61984
27 Venezia -0.31121 -0.45603 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.85999 -0.14786 -0.00326 -0.51846 0 -0.28262
28 Padova -0.41284 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.73395 -0.14786 -0.11031 -0.61353 0 -0.30895
29 Rovigo -0.39113 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.18706 -0.14786 -0.70955 -0.69006 0 -0.32085
30 Pordenone -0.42487 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -1.39756 -0.14786 -1.47143 -0.51631 0 -0.52445
31 Udine -0.37855 -0.46833 -0.10832 -0.13845 -1.40551 -0.14786 -1.94832 -0.57103 0 -0.57404
32 Gorizia -0.42487 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.90052 -0.14786 0.499569 -0.33774 0 -0.23038
33 Trieste -0.33079 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.83349 -0.14786 1.436375 -0.18282 0 -0.09118
34 Imperia -0.3746 -0.40065 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.1732 -0.14786 1.950833 0.505409 1.102083 0.246138
35 Savona -0.3958 -0.42688 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.02024 -0.14786 1.29161 0.288817 0 0.038097
36 Genova -0.37768 -0.40048 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.45071 -0.14786 0.150699 -0.23197 0 -0.18942
37 La Spezia -0.33771 -0.4017 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.19117 -0.14786 -0.37088 -0.60142 0 -0.25528
38 Piacenza -0.37642 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.986 -0.14786 -0.98016 -0.59319 0 -0.4273
39 Parma -0.38654 -0.51527 0.107603 0.259856 -0.75822 0.011026 0.637857 -0.56819 0 -0.13465
40 Reggio nell'Emilia -0.42487 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -1.09391 -0.14786 0.300684 -0.41003 0 -0.282
41 Modena -0.42487 -0.47858 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.67355 -0.14786 0.132329 -0.43539 0 -0.25274
42 Bologna -0.37097 -0.0495 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.05258 -0.14786 1.726343 -0.3665 0 0.054685
43 Ferrara -0.31626 -0.37375 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.73624 -0.14786 0.710247 -0.36359 0 -0.1638
44 Ravenna -0.37465 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.17191 -0.14786 2.04777 -0.39145 0 0.022207
45 Forlì0Cesena -0.2253 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.1626 -0.14786 -0.17873 -0.53396 0 -0.22339
46 Rimini -0.40665 -0.34903 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.667101 -0.14786 3.267299 -0.24382 0 0.282253
47 Massa0Carrara -0.34295 -0.26619 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.99298 -0.14786 0.532139 -0.33153 0 -0.19957
48 Lucca -0.37511 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.47151 -0.14786 0.653533 -0.3958 0 -0.16653
49 Pistoia -0.36782 -0.42854 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.24912 -0.14786 0.550229 -0.55501 0 -0.16054
50 Firenze -0.39392 -0.46394 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.37177 -0.14786 1.084931 -0.21128 0 -0.0834
51 Prato -0.42487 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.693219 0.132763 1.545087 -0.40529 0 0.086541
52 Livorno -0.41672 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.82879 -0.14786 2.577061 -0.25727 0 0.018265
53 Pisa -0.42487 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.49668 -0.14786 0.685386 -0.3872 0 -0.17036
54 Arezzo -0.39283 -0.36917 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.76819 -0.14786 0.800092 -0.66939 0 -0.19935
55 Siena -0.4043 -0.23387 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.2041 -0.14786 0.206833 -0.70235 0 -0.19249
56 Grosseto -0.42487 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.89853 -0.14786 1.621058 -0.47746 0 -0.12108
Figure 5: Z-score of criminal statistics and the composite index of local presence
(CILP) of Organized Crime. Our elaboration on ISTAT data (2008-2010).
R1: confiscated assets; R2: confiscated firms; R3: Mafia-type murders; R4: attempted
Mafia murders; R5: extortion; R6: Mafia-type criminal associations; R7: personal
harms; R8: damages followed by arsons; R9: city councils dissolved for infiltration by
OC.
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# Italian Provinces R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 CILP
57 Perugia -0.42487 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.57898 -0.14786 -0.37103 -0.63117 0 -0.32399
58 Terni -0.42487 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.78039 -0.14786 -1.8452 -0.68461 0 -0.51611
59 Pesaro e Urbino -0.37402 -0.3165 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.42838 -0.14786 -0.8923 -0.55897 0 -0.32942
60 Ancona -0.41904 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.01842 -0.14786 0.332323 -0.25304 0 -0.1409
61 Macerata -0.42487 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.16 -0.14786 0.451565 -0.5118 0 -0.17278
62 Ascoli Piceno -0.40349 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.71014 -0.14786 -0.79122 -0.55657 0 -0.37459
63 Viterbo -0.38098 -0.43521 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.0263 0.298457 0.397423 -0.54266 0 -0.09816
64 Rieti -0.42487 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.99707 -0.14786 -1.44451 -0.65924 0 -0.49284
65 Roma -0.23779 0.055577 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.3482 -0.14786 -1.00395 -0.41197 0 -0.26011
66 Latina -0.14587 -0.23766 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.287818 -0.02162 1.530249 0.104016 0 0.141129
67 Frosinone -0.28509 -0.46427 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.37546 -0.14786 0.564908 -0.6039 0 -0.17316
68 L'Aquila -0.26298 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.13556 -0.14786 0.460296 -0.55838 0 -0.15628
69 Teramo -0.22797 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.25741 0.076137 0.545431 -0.41887 0 -0.11608
70 Pescara -0.3991 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 1.114988 -0.14786 1.835693 -0.5705 0 0.119021
71 Chieti -0.41786 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.256147 -0.14786 -0.92064 -0.35266 0 -0.26055
72 Isernia -0.42487 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.180023 -0.14786 0.793702 -0.40022 0 -0.08459
73 Campobasso -0.40069 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.58221 -0.14786 -1.4236 -0.65964 0 -0.44178
74 Caserta 0.819816 0.966749 2.623755 3.145065 2.706643 4.240449 -0.7475 -0.52246 2.755208 1.776414
75 Benevento -0.32848 -0.07568 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.549418 0.094671 -0.85602 -0.16331 0 -0.11402
76 Napoli 0.249342 0.482172 2.914432 3.064096 2.328841 2.348665 0.029909 -0.44362 2.204167 1.464223
77 Avellino -0.34891 -0.11109 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.557078 -0.14786 0.704737 0.000647 0.551042 0.106542
78 Salerno 0.012289 0.515942 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.782912 -0.08484 0.663542 -0.30639 0.551042 0.209747
79 Foggia -0.09076 -0.4781 1.282529 1.04207 3.233075 -0.04553 1.624112 3.124651 0 1.076894
80 Bari 0.059221 0.133592 0.3053 0.475255 0.733983 -0.0609 0.444809 0.243605 0 0.259429
81 Taranto 0.020651 0.052763 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.268425 -0.14786 -1.26397 1.057156 0 -0.02884
82 Brindisi 1.086378 0.302968 0.127189 0.151295 1.210827 0.198739 -0.53469 1.514472 0 0.450798
83 Lecce -0.11364 0.202218 0.008244 0.264761 -0.12997 0.109456 -1.2692 0.7237 0 -0.02271
84 Potenza -0.40326 -0.51527 0.38235 1.946956 0.155267 0.395772 0.343788 -0.39847 0 0.211904
85 Matera -0.31564 -0.14165 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.00886 -0.14786 -0.89553 -0.34118 0 -0.23109
86 Cosenza -0.0271 -0.13518 -0.10832 -0.13845 1.19646 0.042346 0.388475 1.139206 1.102083 0.384392
87 Crotone 0.79265 -0.51527 4.819567 4.228265 -0.18284 2.268179 -0.3314 2.2069 0 1.476228
88 Catanzaro 1.055856 -0.23964 5.823033 4.582088 2.236539 -0.14786 0.547401 2.329218 0.551042 1.859742
89 Vibo Valentia 0.340618 1.6097 1.597343 1.07725 1.557192 1.10835 -0.10976 4.763184 2.755208 1.633232
90 Reggio di Calabria 4.005898 2.486594 2.740799 2.035144 0.447122 5.772871 -1.60568 3.353822 7.714584 2.994572
91 Trapani 1.685865 1.287795 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.409805 1.293955 2.075115 2.661809 0.551042 1.079846
92 Palermo 5.80292 5.85963 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.40928 1.478813 -0.94942 0.767882 0 1.367087
93 Messina 0.414022 -0.09443 -0.10832 -0.13845 1.152348 -0.14786 -0.83723 2.403978 0.551042 0.355011
94 Agrigento 0.49836 0.488536 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.635842 -0.14786 0.418559 2.24062 1.102083 0.554375
95 Caltanissetta 0.545801 0.416681 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.665362 2.932928 1.20946 6.262363 0.551042 1.370763
96 Enna 0.217146 0.802298 1.537817 2.493822 0.961332 0.661046 -0.54776 1.324624 0 0.827814
97 Catania 0.839735 1.329317 1.989516 1.984022 1.438455 0.172961 -1.35043 0.548065 0 0.772405
98 Ragusa -0.04526 -0.43475 -0.10832 -0.13845 0.194594 0.072313 -0.17842 1.37545 0 0.081907
99 Siracusa -0.03135 -0.32636 0.12681 0.20635 1.537239 -0.14786 0.437544 2.121709 0 0.43601
100 Sassari -0.17714 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.37769 -0.14786 1.454509 0.939708 0 0.103276
101 Nuoro -0.39302 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.75095 -0.14786 -1.35096 2.566101 0 -0.09319
102 Oristano -0.40662 -0.51527 -0.10832 -0.13845 -1.37539 -0.14786 -1.17313 1.452338 0 -0.26808
103 Cagliari -0.28488 -0.48253 -0.10832 -0.13845 -0.42841 -0.14786 -0.90879 1.250536 0 -0.13874
Figure 6: [Continuing] Z-score of criminal statistics and the composite index of local
presence (CILP) of Organized Crime. Our elaboration on ISTAT data (2008-2010).
R1: confiscated assets; R2: confiscated firms; R3: Mafia-type murders; R4: attempted
Mafia murders; R5: extortion; R6: Mafia-type criminal associations; R7: personal
harms; R8: damages followed by arsons; R9: city councils dissolved for infiltration by
OC.
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# Italian Provinces R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 CIEE
1 Torino 0.352932 1.020005 0.655042 0.502511 0.031181 -0.50404 -0.73112 -0.20696 0.088515 0.687193 -0.89525 -0.45234466 0.045638
2 Vercelli 1.155879 -0.77712 -0.77433 -0.21503 0.142441 -0.67856 -0.93425 -0.41949 -1.45705 -0.42577 -0.83659 -0.45234466 -0.47268
3 Novara 0.656485 -0.43332 -0.32417 0.087733 0.094566 -0.78042 -0.82363 -0.61273 -0.4784 -0.97866 0.10045 -0.36067546 -0.32106
4 Verbano0Cusio0Ossola -0.13747 -1.33402 -0.83414 -1.01244 -0.33313 -1.02622 -0.96073 -1.10652 -0.56887 0.371748 0.880888 -0.40099996 -0.53849
5 Cuneo 1.743728 -1.00993 -0.67273 -1.0574 0.059125 -1.02738 -0.70089 -0.97123 -0.96783 -1.28501 -1.36771 -0.45234466 -0.64247
6 Biella 4.378961 -1.01807 -0.73879 0.821337 -0.88685 -0.64704 -0.74848 -1.02588 -1.07138 1.576439 -0.64014 -0.45234466 -0.03769
7 Asti 2.123839 -0.58658 -0.52098 0.423154 2.059573 -0.60445 -0.27996 -0.7881 -1.45705 -1.43144 -1.21571 -0.45234466 -0.2275
8 Alessandria -0.41284 -0.30195 -0.4507 0.367158 -0.39925 -0.26406 -0.81778 0.086709 0.02635 -0.9903 -0.21204 -0.14885268 -0.29313
9 Aosta -0.05954 -0.80139 -0.80304 0.501189 4.874944 -0.95141 -0.61449 0.308046 -0.8858 -0.66369 -0.08842 -0.32041052 0.041334
10 Varese -0.1075 -0.56517 -0.52838 -0.55628 -0.37768 -0.55218 -0.82358 -0.61354 -0.04867 0.584947 -1.0644 1.38330301 -0.27243
11 Como -1.09793 -0.69333 -0.59493 -1.3654 -0.4342 -0.68376 -0.80217 -0.42873 -0.96913 0.637314 -1.21773 -0.15297869 -0.65025
12 Lecco -1.51231 -0.69308 -0.65975 -0.69023 -0.87623 -1.0311 -0.20615 -0.73266 -1.24387 -1.85889 -1.55132 -0.45234466 -0.95899
13 Sondrio -0.89986 -1.52482 -0.87724 -0.74631 0.892755 -0.76336 -0.28723 -0.08253 -1.45705 -0.4755 0.586619 0.69169186 -0.4119
14 Milano 0.037447 2.2059 0.766183 0.842012 -0.0943 -0.57467 -0.36946 -0.28279 -0.69078 0.514654 -0.50462 -0.43349541 0.118006
15 Lodi -0.85559 -0.55953 -0.36315 -0.33089 -1.04632 -0.82084 -0.90171 -0.79652 -1.13829 -1.34583 -1.62094 -0.45234466 -0.85266
16 Bergamo -0.27968 -0.01696 -0.37902 -0.35439 -0.92055 -0.84965 -0.8798 -0.57916 -0.58481 -0.15179 -1.28992 -0.45234466 -0.56151
17 Brescia 1.49902 0.247712 -0.23878 -0.09852 0.958907 -0.5516 0.02334 -0.24731 -0.51782 0.727585 -0.28787 -0.44566482 0.089083
18 Pavia -0.35781 0.31769 -0.38687 -0.83221 -0.49611 -0.71098 -0.43931 -0.70139 -0.65216 -0.88472 -1.16306 -0.45234466 -0.56327
19 Cremona 1.209602 -0.62875 -0.53253 -0.19283 1.896369 -1.00244 -0.7702 0.818879 -0.85946 -1.22952 -1.08706 -0.45234466 -0.23586
20 Mantova 0.131826 -0.45496 -0.63274 -0.86205 -0.68378 -1.05593 -0.76038 -0.7455 -1.28248 -1.54387 -0.42859 -0.43218572 -0.72922
21 Bolzano/Bozen -0.44136 -0.9304 -0.77083 -1.07941 0.042533 -0.74618 -0.95095 -0.81562 -1.45705 0.039799 -0.84676 -0.43583519 -0.69934
22 Trento -0.65495 -0.83793 -0.74112 -0.85173 -0.25273 -0.86648 -0.90825 -0.92195 -1.04572 -0.47061 -1.39592 -0.45234466 -0.78331
23 Verona -0.23182 -0.02974 -0.50082 -0.11418 -0.20725 -0.426 -0.90347 -0.69067 0.049053 -1.23775 -0.17319 -0.43414656 -0.40833
24 Vicenza -0.71896 -0.58368 -0.60337 -0.67602 -0.30441 -1.00262 -0.90264 -1.22111 -0.70555 -1.61426 -0.69764 -0.44273542 -0.78942
25 Belluno -1.53332 -1.45111 -0.94555 -1.18344 -0.59037 -0.8654 -0.97801 -1.16889 -1.45705 -1.67074 -1.6091 -0.45234466 -1.15878
26 Treviso -0.98124 -0.79979 -0.77673 -1.33802 -0.96688 -0.84358 -0.95273 -1.10299 -1.45705 -1.67321 -0.71957 -0.44292495 -1.00456
27 Venezia 0.657113 0.57597 -0.50651 -0.36813 1.235812 2.706986 -0.28654 -0.42203 -0.35996 -0.20458 -0.02109 -0.20780113 0.23327
28 Padova -0.23363 0.274968 -0.47481 -0.49898 1.103355 -0.54646 -0.86638 -1.04714 -0.91361 2.572898 -0.29044 -0.40719624 -0.11062
29 Rovigo -1.16045 -0.70541 -0.75132 -0.93277 0.387756 -0.79475 -0.84185 -0.24871 -1.16513 -1.36081 0.138613 -0.45234466 -0.65726
30 Pordenone -0.13506 -0.79485 -0.83985 -1.13413 -0.78565 -1.03594 -0.88191 -0.75704 -1.45705 -1.77503 -1.81449 -0.45234466 -0.98861
31 Udine 0.182116 -0.775 -0.82614 -1.13711 -0.69343 -0.32209 -0.94561 1.949702 -1.45705 -1.15313 -0.75593 -0.25122481 -0.51541
32 Gorizia 0.117476 -0.82347 -0.78871 -0.33378 0.295625 -0.42176 -0.86725 0.724675 -1.45705 1.438923 -0.88932 -0.21784461 -0.26854
33 Trieste 7.147809 -0.38413 -0.60887 -0.6185 0.710055 -0.69909 -0.60796 1.60333 0.071289 0.067725 -0.1443 -0.24057001 0.524732
34 Imperia 0.33862 0.338597 -0.61894 0.094436 0.925701 1.827616 -0.4437 1.714521 -0.47169 3.028777 5.717905 -0.45234466 0.999959
35 Savona 0.192071 0.266917 -0.39546 1.008052 3.691167 1.88683 -0.76495 -0.62528 0.053817 0.586373 0.327929 -0.27751578 0.495829
36 Genova 0.196609 0.931898 -0.01589 0.07054 2.301162 0.601374 0.211749 5.140145 -0.63901 1.876825 -0.57325 3.26838508 1.114211
37 La Spezia 1.022784 -0.10294 -0.49333 0.062533 2.835758 2.163738 -0.07756 0.063289 -0.80689 1.352382 0.35089 1.26928012 0.63666
38 Piacenza -0.08183 -0.37454 -0.57816 -1.13055 0.622922 -0.79931 -0.97168 -0.10562 -0.95677 -0.74905 -1.19864 -0.45234466 -0.56463
39 Parma -0.87709 0.225596 -0.46745 0.045082 0.489848 0.115965 -0.37944 -0.68355 -1.12833 -0.82658 -1.61489 -0.3940372 -0.45791
40 Reggio nell'Emilia -0.04406 0.225209 -0.43977 -1.1903 -0.49503 -0.92267 -0.64466 -0.8363 -0.35443 -0.81789 -0.03991 -0.38749282 -0.49561
41 Modena -0.04736 0.940154 -0.32285 -0.49806 -0.64273 -0.78053 -0.90473 0.629805 -1.1463 -0.18584 -0.80039 -0.44038288 -0.34993
42 Bologna 1.565178 1.632458 0.103713 1.661787 0.498291 -0.37126 -0.53706 0.132203 -0.79582 1.242389 -0.60563 -0.32407434 0.350182
43 Ferrara -0.15389 0.136589 -0.56468 -0.54983 -0.99447 -0.36929 -0.35573 -0.95131 -0.85276 -0.24259 -1.69241 -0.28982237 -0.57335
44 Ravenna 2.280239 0.868568 -0.2508 -0.24908 -0.22872 0.038412 -0.63253 0.112918 -1.27219 0.6681 -1.35864 -0.16988327 -0.01613
45 Forlì0Cesena -0.10018 -0.11583 -0.59403 0.286408 -0.56177 -0.53174 -0.6694 -0.43609 0.029803 -0.06477 -0.79783 -0.17556943 -0.31092
46 Rimini 1.866112 2.18755 0.320045 0.663673 0.534718 0.705099 -0.71946 -0.59905 1.387127 2.38726 -1.23925 -0.42534547 0.589039
47 Massa0Carrara -0.10331 -0.07247 -0.56826 -0.7498 3.087006 -0.39649 -0.68442 -0.94945 -1.45705 0.210368 -1.81449 -0.37038575 -0.3224
48 Lucca 0.033586 0.589311 -0.34163 -0.54556 0.424209 -0.01304 -0.86654 0.047768 -0.35019 -0.20707 -0.9158 -0.43110667 -0.21467
49 Pistoia 1.330783 -0.07299 -0.46818 0.102661 -0.15323 -0.36018 -0.80967 0.458517 2.269963 -0.60204 0.750982 -0.36676645 0.173321
50 Firenze 1.320251 0.741022 -0.21564 0.771762 1.240513 0.467636 -0.55904 -0.8292 -1.31177 1.71051 -0.21517 -0.44395626 0.223077
51 Prato 2.115699 0.197233 0.270607 -0.49963 -0.70268 0.13666 -0.09698 -0.85306 -0.28928 1.840244 -1.10541 -0.24994637 0.063621
52 Livorno -0.75394 0.213024 -0.54022 -0.6163 -1.01919 0.413647 0.70415 -1.18033 0.028192 1.480209 -0.91264 0.3557687 -0.1523
53 Pisa 1.453982 0.778158 -0.46137 0.328593 0.220381 -0.14378 -0.73102 -0.9025 0.981816 0.306835 -0.96758 -0.45234466 0.034265
54 Arezzo 0.657548 -0.83205 -0.65202 0.049468 0.197884 -0.07902 -0.8622 1.218099 0.003251 -0.3554 -0.42176 -0.21154175 -0.10731
55 Siena -0.8389 -0.99245 -0.8036 -0.19397 0.63618 -0.87873 -1.01164 0.048113 -0.65679 -1.42093 -1.0028 -0.45234466 -0.63066
56 Grosseto -0.16812 -0.26618 -0.80397 -0.19525 2.015186 0.559558 -0.587 -0.24352 -1.45705 1.17023 0.707164 -0.26765872 0.038617
Figure 7: Z-score of criminal statistics and the composite index of economic extent
(CIEE) of Organized Crime. Our elaboration on ISTAT data (2008-2010).
R1: exploitation of prostitution; R2: thefts; R3: robberies; R4: informatic frauds; R5:
digital frauds; R6: counterfeiting; R7: copyright violations; R8: money laundering;
R9: usury; R10: drugs crimes; R11: criminal associations (non Mafia-type); R12:
smuggling of goods.
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# Italian Provinces R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 CIEE
57 Perugia 1.674033 -0.27865 -0.56444 -0.77989 -1.14075 -0.75924 -0.77499 -0.88756 -1.24112 0.729622 -0.0273 -0.45234466 -0.37522
58 Terni -0.3318 -0.65111 -0.65008 -0.42463 0.273336 -0.71278 -0.44707 -4.4E-05 -0.52427 -0.09678 0.632686 -0.45234466 -0.28207
59 Pesaro e Urbino -0.74191 -0.91196 -0.67487 -1.27914 -0.96666 -0.57867 -0.83217 0.137056 -0.69973 -0.42676 -0.20186 -0.45234466 -0.63575
60 Ancona 1.602068 -0.71614 -0.65189 -0.03552 -0.16398 1.070708 -0.3109 -0.51639 0.054466 -0.11038 0.304651 -0.03146492 0.04127
61 Macerata 1.405935 -0.8708 -0.65318 -0.02622 0.125187 0.073091 0.89701 -1.23712 -1.23457 0.784609 -0.04574 -0.40035486 -0.09851
62 Ascoli Piceno 1.244118 -0.53658 -0.58769 -0.45703 -0.86963 -0.11644 -0.08963 -0.71321 -1.08659 -0.41033 0.102209 -0.45234466 -0.3311
63 Viterbo -0.41481 -0.85115 -0.69229 0.228574 0.693823 -0.26865 -0.48956 -0.76105 -0.08833 0.034886 -0.28252 -0.45234466 -0.27862
64 Rieti -1.57395 -1.32208 -0.78978 -0.78922 -0.56945 -0.64856 -0.77199 0.234345 -0.99934 -0.1858 -0.71637 -0.39948896 -0.71097
65 Roma 0.159474 1.304106 0.447631 -0.04313 0.499428 2.398133 1.438844 0.302078 -0.30745 0.971988 -0.02756 0.0441139 0.598971
66 Latina 0.299258 -0.33087 -0.36604 -0.09089 -0.51942 0.634169 0.257282 0.609383 1.180745 0.17302 0.755727 -0.45234466 0.179168
67 Frosinone -0.85039 -1.35137 -0.6394 -0.02245 -0.20568 -0.66655 -0.59271 0.688523 1.305368 -1.14193 4.358048 -0.45234466 0.03576
68 L'Aquila -0.38001 -1.34145 -0.79475 -0.56361 0.026711 -0.85434 -0.09474 -0.60989 2.751742 0.182311 0.60238 -0.45234466 -0.12733
69 Teramo 1.044007 -0.36176 -0.56229 -0.12858 0.4025 -0.1733 0.380029 -0.68176 1.576728 0.576348 0.584842 -0.42558641 0.185932
70 Pescara 2.092017 0.195831 -0.13091 0.778715 1.998731 -0.5485 0.85961 0.629758 1.933233 0.966035 3.810489 -0.40053463 1.015372
71 Chieti -0.97858 -0.80631 -0.69423 -0.73002 -0.40824 -1.05174 0.147138 -0.50856 0.9142 -1.2006 -0.48662 -0.45234466 -0.52133
72 Isernia -0.72477 -1.5525 -0.81084 1.162384 14.48333 1.902588 -0.36756 -0.64999 1.796447 0.584703 1.637769 -0.45234466 1.417435
73 Campobasso -0.99837 -1.09479 -0.89157 0.083655 -0.56389 -0.80836 -0.42024 0.010479 2.913368 -1.40598 1.595685 -0.45234466 -0.16936
74 Caserta 0.171428 -0.76297 1.278994 0.159775 -0.96225 0.744303 1.300194 0.321265 0.617814 -0.74595 0.024336 -0.02983567 0.176425
75 Benevento -1.08608 -1.51361 -0.66642 -0.0405 -0.31877 -0.75113 0.157172 -0.70364 3.804758 -1.31831 -0.29264 -0.45234466 -0.26513
76 Napoli -0.42512 -0.18213 3.558964 3.310037 -0.6637 1.46029 2.588086 1.295022 1.78279 0.624022 1.008174 3.65218886 1.500718
77 Avellino -0.35515 -1.55651 -0.71763 0.137956 -0.96581 -0.61025 0.529285 -0.54396 0.023813 -1.42682 0.983256 -0.3192866 -0.40176
78 Salerno -0.72109 -0.97874 -0.40813 0.304356 -0.23508 -0.39206 2.106592 -0.34855 1.090083 -1.02093 -0.18793 -0.44481652 -0.10302
79 Foggia -0.25593 -0.13958 0.034837 -0.12361 -0.43521 -0.22012 2.087852 2.625689 0.555147 -0.92386 0.500243 -0.26894799 0.286375
80 Bari -0.48384 -0.01171 0.096993 -0.54727 -0.56789 0.138975 -0.26551 0.451688 1.112857 -0.767 -0.52801 0.2603237 -0.09253
81 Taranto -0.3711 -0.66868 -0.50738 -0.7108 0.013543 0.72782 1.168784 -0.37751 0.037207 -0.12812 0.000349 -0.26539451 -0.09011
82 Brindisi -0.54009 -0.63868 -0.44652 -0.35713 -0.69437 2.00859 2.1966 0.111389 1.412348 -0.40166 0.581289 0.04463139 0.273033
83 Lecce -1.2259 -0.8616 -0.64766 -0.77726 -1.03775 0.171714 0.364066 -1.18522 -1.01341 -0.49649 -0.41124 -0.40102124 -0.62681
84 Potenza -1.6961 -1.7732 -0.87272 -0.81329 -0.66181 -0.39998 -0.32862 -0.81697 -0.70525 -0.12342 -0.22408 -0.45234466 -0.73898
85 Matera -1.89966 -1.6269 -0.88705 -1.57819 0.264046 -0.46445 -0.74289 -0.63621 -1.10214 -0.68834 0.34041 -0.45234466 -0.78948
86 Cosenza -1.04626 -1.08819 -0.57396 -0.81396 -0.37659 -0.50722 -0.03316 0.489391 -0.6697 -0.85938 0.756694 -0.44098382 -0.43028
87 Crotone -1.29906 -1.66704 -0.72944 -0.17509 -0.8786 -0.26395 -0.65786 -0.99949 -0.62434 -0.47264 0.460656 -0.45234466 -0.6466
88 Catanzaro -0.48186 -0.82782 -0.71117 -0.15134 -0.27472 -0.41518 -0.35802 -0.21095 0.310349 -0.05939 -0.26482 -0.45234466 -0.32477
89 Vibo Valentia 0.128791 -1.3413 -0.55619 0.104942 -0.82507 0.244439 -0.57382 -0.09333 0.705321 -1.11672 -0.23825 -0.00216521 -0.29695
90 Reggio di Calabria -0.74826 -1.00901 -0.18336 0.088692 0.368563 -0.31947 -0.2814 1.450982 0.074129 -0.44273 2.678594 0.13679234 0.151127
91 Trapani -1.30163 -0.57686 -0.51449 -0.66527 -0.47603 -0.56423 -0.6399 -0.53828 0.200241 -0.77935 0.097251 -0.45234466 -0.51758
92 Palermo -1.46013 -0.08177 0.940801 0.724731 0.053121 -0.4121 0.614897 -0.68471 -0.35507 -0.72379 -0.26446 0.19144317 -0.12142
93 Messina -0.58324 -0.96538 -0.49206 -0.20683 -0.66962 0.436739 0.034057 -0.26116 0.863305 -0.44719 -0.33864 -0.43957833 -0.2558
94 Agrigento -0.80958 -1.31521 -0.62755 -1.21502 -1.09509 -0.68997 -0.07065 -0.61919 -0.66158 -1.3325 -0.07741 -0.43397281 -0.74564
95 Caltanissetta -1.89966 -0.81143 -0.40705 -0.95406 -1.12828 -0.72622 -0.38134 0.040205 0.136309 -1.35019 0.927234 -0.45234466 -0.5839
96 Enna -1.59802 -1.53993 -0.76246 -1.11638 -0.66575 -0.74013 -0.14541 -0.62988 0.629454 -1.36904 0.213332 -0.45234466 -0.68138
97 Catania 0.045552 0.814142 1.163357 -0.86603 0.534914 -0.24196 0.094168 1.533301 -0.46032 -0.05079 0.530299 0.04701692 0.26197
98 Ragusa -0.9082 -0.49967 -0.57685 -0.68205 -0.05513 -0.27655 -0.16833 0.052766 -0.76722 -1.01268 2.779503 -0.3726842 -0.20726
99 Siracusa -0.60364 -0.77334 -0.48442 -0.62619 -0.52699 -0.61833 -0.38696 -0.68101 1.054141 -0.37925 -0.17897 -0.2659128 -0.37257
100 Sassari -0.43968 -0.89467 -0.66734 -0.66419 -0.44854 0.101216 0.904686 -0.5314 -1.00786 1.795921 -0.72062 -0.38346678 -0.24633
101 Nuoro -1.10226 -1.33324 -0.5838 -1.35497 -0.7215 -0.30172 -0.37776 -0.47347 -1.18057 -1.76598 -1.14398 -0.45234466 -0.8993
102 Oristano -1.21365 -1.59195 -0.82482 -1.52783 -0.22396 -0.8947 -0.83956 -0.38815 -0.98128 -1.50113 -1.5256 -0.45234466 -0.99708
103 Cagliari -0.99002 -1.08564 -0.61882 -0.17225 0.136045 -0.75101 -0.45267 -0.10396 -1.3639 0.139183 -0.90814 -0.45234466 -0.55196
Figure 8: [Continuing ] Z-score of criminal statistics and the composite index of
economic extent (CIEE) of Organized Crime. Our elaboration on ISTAT data (2008-
2010).
R1: exploitation of prostitution; R2: thefts; R3: robberies; R4: informatic frauds; R5:
digital frauds; R6: counterfeiting; R7: copyright violations; R8: money laundering;
R9: usury; R10: drugs crimes; R11: criminal associations (non Mafia-type); R12:
smuggling of goods.
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Figure 9: Correlation Matrix between CILP and CIEE in Italian macroregions. Our
elaboration on ISTAT data (2008-2010).
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